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INTERPRETING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT:
ARE THE COURTS UNDERMINING THE ACT?
GORDON ANDERSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the central controversies at the time of the enactment of the Em-
ployment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA), and subsequently, has concerned the
role of the specialist Employment Court.' The most fundamental question is
whether any role remains for a specialist court within the "contract-based"
labor law model introduced by the ECA. If employment contracts are no dif-
ferent from any other form of commercial contract, as new-right2 proponents
of the Act argue, there is no need for a specialist court and the courts of
general jurisdiction are the most appropriate forum for employment dis-
putes. A second debate centers on new-right allegations that many of the
Court's decisions have been contrary to Parliament's intentions in enacting
the ECA and that the Court has failed to adapt to the principles of "freedom
of contract" embodied in the Act. The intensity of both debates can be ex-
plained by the new-right's failure in 1991 to achieve the abolition of the
Court and the repeal of the personal grievance provisions, and thus the in-
troduction of "at-will" employment.' This setback to its deregulation
* Associate Professor of Commercial Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New
Zealand. He has written extensively on labor law issues, including the ECA, and also made
extensive submissions to the parliamentary Select Committee considering the EC Bill in
1990-91.
1. The Employment Court that was created by the Employment Contracts Act is the
most recent in a line of specialist labor courts. The term "Labour Court" will be used in rela-
tion to pre-ECA decisions.
2. The term "new-right" is used as a convenient shorthand for those persons and groups
holding the combination of neo-classical economic and libertarian beliefs that has driven
much of the structural reform in New Zealand since 1984. The main voices of the new-right
in labor market matters, the New Zealand Employers' Federation (NZEF) and the New Zea-
land Business Roundtable (BRT), cooperate closely and in general advance a common ideo-
logical position. For a general discussion of the new-right in New Zealand, see JANE KELSEY,
EcoNoMic FUNDAMENTALISM: THE NEW ZEALAND ExPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT? (1995) [hereinafter THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT].
3. For a discussion of the political and policy debate relating to the Court in 1991, see
Rose Ryan & Pat Walsh, Common Law v. Labour Law: The New Zealand Debate, 6 AusTL.
J. LAB. L. 230 (1993) [hereinafter Common Law].
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agenda, and the determination to reverse it, helps explain much of the sub-
sequent debate.
The new-right criticism of the Court focuses on two aspects of the
ECA. The first is the extent to which the ECA supports collective bargain-
ing and centers on the interpretation of Subsection 12(2). This subsection
requires an employer to recognize the authority of an authorized union as
bargaining agent during negotiations for a collective contract.' Given the
paucity of other provisions relating to collective bargaining, this subsection
has become the crucial legal support for collective bargaining. Its interpre-
tation is thus of central importance both to employees seeking to bargain
collectively and to employers seeking to restrict their freedom to do so. The
second aspect is the protection against unjustified dismissals in Part III of
the ECA.5 Unlike collective bargaining, where the legal issues were based
on novel legislation, the unjustified dismissal provisions have existed in
legislation since 1973, with case law well developed by 1991. The new-right
argument that the personal grievance provisions should be repealed, and that
employment should be "at will," was not accepted by Parliament in 1991,
which not only re-enacted the substantive provisions of the law but substan-
tially extended the range of employees entitled to have access to the provi-
sions.
A third factor affecting the interpretation of the ECA is the develop-
ment of an apparent divergence in approach to labor law between the Em-
ployment Court and the Court of Appeal. Although in the past having been
not only supportive of the Employment Court but itself innovative in em-
ployment matters, the Court of Appeal has more recently taken an increas-
ingly orthodox approach to labor law. Since it is the superior court, its ap-
proach will clearly be the most influential.7
This Article will not attempt to describe developments in the law in
detail, although these will be outlined! Instead, it will focus on the legal dy-
4. Although an employee may authorize any person to act as a representative, authority
to represent has been an issue only where the representative is a union seeking to negotiate a
collective employment contract. For this reason, this Article will in general use the term
"union" rather than "representative." The term "collective employment contract" as defined
in the ECA means merely a contract having more than one employee party. ECA § 2. The
word "collective" can thus be highly misleading; as a result, in this Article the term
"collective contract" will be used to denote a contract having the characteristics of a collec-
tive agreement.
5. An unjustified dismissal is one form of a personal grievance which also encompasses
other forms of grievance, such as discrimination and sexual harassment. For the full defini-
tion, see ECA § 27(1).
6. "Orthodox" is used in the sense of an approach to labor law that sees employment in
purely contractual terms, which tends to favor a pro-employer unitary view of the employ-
ment relationship and which has a tendency to be opposed to collective organization and
collective action. The approach is historically favored by the common law.
7. The Court of Appeal is New Zealand's highest domestic court and in labor law mat-
ters the final court of appeal; ECA § 135(5).
8. A detailed discussion and description of the law can be found in GORDON ANDERSON
Er AL., MAZENGARB'S EMPLOYMENT LAW (1997) [hereinafter MAZENGARB], especially vol-
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namics involved in the interpretation of the ECA with the primary aim of
evaluating the argument that the Employment Court has in some way un-
dermined the ECA by not adhering to Parliament's intentions in passing the
Act. While this Article attempts to analyze the decisions of the Court and its
interpretation of the ECA in legal terms, it is, however, by no means clear
that the surrounding debate can be characterized as a legal one. Nor is it
clear that the legal appropriateness of the Court's decisions may be less im-
portant than the Court's failure, first, to reflect the political and economic
perspective of the Act held by its proponents, and second, to advance the la-
bor market outcomes sought by those proponents. If this argument is cor-
rect, developments in New Zealand may provide some lessons on the nature
of legal debate in a highly charged political context. 9
II. THE EMPLOYMENT COURT
A. The Evolution of the Court
New Zealand has had a specialist labor court since the country devel-
oped an indigenous system of labor law in 1894. The current Employment
Court is the direct successor of that Court."0 Initially, the Court settled dis-
putes of interest by arbitrating on wages and conditions of employment ap-
plying to particular industries and later determined national wage levels
through a number of general wage adjustment mechanisms. The Court did
have a limited enforcement function, but this was largely confined to the
interpretation of awards and wage recovery actions. This phase in the
Court's evolution ended with the Industrial Relations Act 1973, which di-
vided the old Court of Arbitration into two: an Industrial Commission re-
sponsible for interest disputes and an Industrial Court having an extended
jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights matters, including the new per-
sonal grievances jurisdiction." Although the two bodies were remerged in
1977 to form the Arbitration Court, the Labour Relations Act 1987 recon-
stituted the court as the Labour Court and again created a separate Arbitra-
tion Commission to deal with interest disputes. The jurisdiction of the Court
was extended to give it exclusive jurisdiction over common law actions re-
lating to strikes and lockouts founded on one of the economic torts, which
ume 1. For a discussion of developments in the law of collective bargaining, see Gordon An-
derson, Collective Bargaining and the Law: New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act Five
Years On, 9 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 103 (1996) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining].
9. For an alternative view of the interaction between the policy of the ECA and the
courts, see Margaret Wilson, Policy, Law and the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Employment
Law Cases in New Zealand, 8 AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 203 (1995) [hereinafter Wilson, Policy].
10. For a history of the arbitration system and of the changing role of the Court, see
JAMES HOLT, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN NEw ZEALAND: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS (1986);
NOEL WOODS, INDUSTRIAL CONCIUATION AND ARBrrRATION IN NEW ZEALAND (1963).
11. The personal grievances workload expanded rapidly in the late 1970s and still ac-
counts for the great bulk of the Court's case load.
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was of significance as it was the first time the jurisdiction extended to tradi-
tional common law actions.
The significance of these changes was noted by Hughes: "Thus the La-
bour Court-unlike its predecessors-is not a court of conciliation and ar-
bitration. It is purely a court of record, acting as a court of appeal and re-
view with some important first instance jurisdictions."'2 The ECA not only
retained the specialist court, renaming it the Employment Court, but signifi-
cantly expanded its jurisdiction to include "exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine any action founded on an employment contract."' 3 This
change had the effect of bringing all employees within the Court's jurisdic-
tion while at the same time extending its jurisdiction to encompass a wide
range of common law actions arising out of breaches of a contract of em-
ployment, including breaches of the implied terms of fidelity, confidential-
ity and the like, as well as actions concerning restraint of trade clauses. "'4
The Court retained its previous jurisdiction over statutory-based actions, in-
cluding some new rights of action introduced by the ECA such as the right
to challenge "harsh and oppressive contracts,"' 5 and its common law juris-
diction over the economic torts relating to strikes and lockouts.
Thus, in the relatively short space of time between 1987 and 1991, the
jurisdiction of the Court expanded from actions deriving purely from a
statutory origin, effectively confined to private sector workers covered by a
collective instrument, to a broad-based common law and statutory jurisdic-
tion covering all workers having the legal status of an "employee." This ex-
panded the Court's coverage from about 60 percent of the employed work-
force in 1987 to the entire workforce after 1991.16 Before 1991 that section
of the workforce had its terms and conditions of employment determined by
common law contracts of employment with any disputes coming within the
purview of the courts of general jurisdiction. 7 It was, therefore, the ECA
that gave the Court jurisdiction over virtually all legal actions arising out of
the employment relationship and which finally created a truly specialist la-
bor court covering all employees. In many respects this represented a double
defeat for the new-right. Not only was the specialist court retained, but its
jurisdiction was enhanced to cover common law actions based on the con-
tract of employment. The new-right argues that common law actions are
best dealt with by the courts of general jurisdiction which are less prone to
judicial "activism" and more likely to remain guided by strict contractual
rules.
12. JOHN HUGHES, I LABOUR LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 9.30 (1990).
13. ECA § 3(l).
14. Prior to 1991, such actions came within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
15. ECA § 57.
16. Common Law, supra note 3, at 231. "Employed workforce" for this purpose
meaning employees employed under a contract of employment (or contract of service).
17. State employees were covered by a separate legal regime from private sector em-
ployees until the State Sector Act of 1988.
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B. The Debate on the Court
Before discussing the way the Court has interpreted the ECA, some ref-
erence should be made to the content and nature of the current debate on the
future of the Court to provide some feel for its direction and tone. The new-
right, through a combination of skilled public relations, including the ability
to influence the media, to finance and coordinate its campaign, and its lob-
bying ability, has dominated the post-ECA debate. 8 The two major elements
in this campaign are the commissioning and publication of research papers
arguing the new-right position and an active media campaign to highlight
this research, often combined with public attacks on the Court and its sup-
porters. 9
The Business Roundtable (BRT) and New Zealand Employers' Federa-
tion (NZEF) have jointly published a number of papers on the Court and its
decisions and have organized seminars to promote those views.2" The first of
these papers analyzes a number of mainly pre-ECA decisions which are
seen as unduly restrictive for employers." These include cases that require
procedural fairness in dismissals, that place some limits on the use of fixed-
term contracts, and that relate to implied terms in contracts. The paper
leaves little doubt as to its overall conclusion:
It is questionable, however, whether there is any need to retain a specialist
Employment Court.... The analysis contained in this report demonstrates
the activist nature of the Court and the frequency with which it has ex-
tended the boundaries of its jurisdiction by purported reference to estab-
lished principles.., the Court has demonstrated an intention to intervene
in the management of the employment relationship in a manner which
does not form part of the statutory framework of the Employment Con-
tracts Act.22
The argument that the Court should be abolished because of its alleged
refusal to implement the ECA as Parliament intended is made most strongly
in a paper by Howard which analyzes the decisions of the Court to late
18. For a discussion on how the new-right had been able to dominate policy debate, see
THE NEw ZEALAND EXPERIMENT, supra note 2, especially chapters 1 to 4.
19. For example, the Chairman of the BRT has said of leading industrial relations aca-
demics who had been critical of the ECA that "incompetence is no barrier to lifelong em-
ployment in New Zealand Universities." Why Not Full Employment by 2000?, TuE EM-
PLOYER, June 1996, at 10.
20. Professor Richard Epstein in particular is a frequent visitor to New Zealand and a
participant in such seminars. See, for example, the report of his address at one such seminar,
The Judges Who Chip Away at the Freedom of Employment Contracts, THE PRESS, May 23,
1996, at 11. For a comment on one BRT seminar, see Gordon Anderson, Specialist Courts
and the Interpretation of the Employment Contracts Act, EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 10 (Jan.
1996).
21. BRT & NZEF, A STUDY OF THE LABOUR-EMPLOYMENT COURT (1992) [hereinafter TiE
COURT].
22. Id. at 42-43.
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1996.23 Howard is critical not only of the Employment Court but also, in
some decisions, of the Court of Appeal. His main conclusion is that the
most "spectacular" reason the ECA is "not working as well as it could and
should" is the "quite extraordinary resistance to implementation of the Act
manifested by a section of the judiciary."' Unlike the earlier paper, Howard
has no room even for a specialist employment division in the High Court.25
An equally strong plea for the abolition of the Court is made in another
BRT-NZEF publication by Robertson.2 6 The arguments in these papers,
and the tone of them, is taken up by other new-right commentators."' The
second plank in the new-right attack is its media campaign. It is, perhaps,
not necessary to describe this in detail, but the point should be made that it
is notable for its intensity, its consistency, and in many cases for its highly
personalized and emotional tenor. Some idea of this tenor may be obtained
from the headlines such stories attract.28 These attacks have had the political
impact intended, as it is clear that the law, including the decisions of the
Employment Court, is being subjected to an unusually intense degree of
scrutiny at a political level and that further deregulation is highly likely.21
The question addressed in this Article is whether these attacks have any le-
gal substance.3"
23. CoLIN HOWARD, INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AcT 1991
[hereinafter INTERPRETATION].
24. Id. at 24.
25. Id. at 24. This suggestion had been made in THE COURT, supra note 21, at 43.
26. BERNARD ROBERTSON, THE STATUS AND JURISDICTION OF THE EMPLOYMENT COURT
(1996) [hereinafter JURISDICION]. Robertson appears to argue that the creation of any spe-
cialist court is a threat to judicial independence. Id. at 60.
27. See, e.g., WOLFGANG KASPER, FREE TO WORK (1996), published by an Australian
new-right body, The Centre for Independent Studies.
28. See, e.g., Employer Wants Court Abolished, THE DoMINION, Aug. 10, 1992, at 1;
Employment Contracts Act Undermined by Judicial Activism, THE INDEPENDENT, May 14,
1993, at 6; Employment Court Judges Need to Fall into Line with Free Market, NAT'L Bus.
REv., Jan. 19, 1996, at 18. One leading financial paper, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 16, 1994, at
14, has made the following, not untypical, comment in an editorial entitled How the Employ-
ment Court Fosters Unemployment:
Thus the Employment Court can be seen as a major contributor to unemploy-
ment. This body, topped off by chief judge Tom Goddard, seems to be out to
usurp the power of Parliament. By making its own law rather than interpreting
and enforcing that enacted by our elected representatives, the employment
court seems hell-bent on becoming a law unto itself.
29. See recent speeches by the Minister of Labour at the Government to Business Sum-
mit, Apr. 3, 1997, or at the Labour-Management-Government Relations Seminar, Mar. 20,
1997, which can be found (or accessed) on his homepage: <http://www. execu-
tive.govt.nz/minister/bradford/>.
30. For references to various newspaper articles and comments thereon, see Gordon An-
derson, The Judiciary, The Court and Appeals, EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 90 (1993); Politics,
the Judiciary and the Court-Again, EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 2 (1995).
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III. INTERPRETING THE ECA
Statutory interpretation is, at best, more of an art than a science and, in
the case of the provisions that are central to this Article, the difficulties
facing an interpreting court are particularly acute. The supreme law-making
body in New Zealand is Parliament; thus, in interpreting a statute, the proper
function of any court is to interpret the statute to give effect to Parliament's
intentions. The general trend in statutory interpretation in New Zealand3 is
to take a purposive approach to the statute in question and, to quote the Acts
Interpretation Act, to give the Act "such fair, large, and liberal construction
and interpretation as will best ensure the object of the Act... according to
its true intent, meaning and spirit."" Apart from the words of the substantive
provisions of an Act, the primary statement of Parliament's intentions is to
be found in the objects statements in the long title of the Act and, increas-
ingly, in a section that specifies the objects of each part of the Act. The ECA
is notable for such statements.
Where the words of the Act are clear and an appropriate interpretation
can be derived, the courts are generally reluctant to go further but will use
extrinsic materials where the Act is unclear. Two extrinsic sources are par-
ticularly relevant in the context of this Article. The first, the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 which, while it does not allow the courts to override
other legislation, does require that, when an enactment can be given a
meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms in the Act, such a meaning
shall be preferred to any other meaning.3 Second, New Zealand's interna-
tional obligations,' even if not incorporated into domestic law, may be
taken into account in interpreting a statute. In the case of labor law, ILO
conventions have been used for guidance even if not ratified by New Zea-
land. The parliamentary history of the legislation may also be used for guid-
ance, although Burrows suggests that the courts use such material, and espe-
cially material from Hansard, only when it confirms an interpretation
derived from more traditional sources.
The ECA presents particular difficulties for an interpreting court for a
number of reasons. Foremost amongst these is that Parliament has used the
sparsest possible language in relation to the two issues central to this Arti-
cle. The total Parliamentary guidance on unjustified dismissal is the word-
ing of Section 27 (1)(a), which states that employees have personal griev-
ances if they have a claim that they have "been unjustifiably dismissed."36
Although Part III of the Act gives considerable guidance on the procedures
31. For a fuller exposition, see JOHN BURROWS, STATUTE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND (1992),
from which the following paragraph is drawn.
32. Acts Interpretation Act § 5(j), 1924.
33. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act § 6, 1990.
34. BURROWS, supra note 31, at 238.
35. Id. at 140.
36. Employment Contracts Act § 27(1)(a), 1991 (N.Z.).
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and on remedies, there is no further elaboration of what is meant by either
"unjustifiable" or "dismissal." The provisions relating to the negotiation of
collective employment contracts are somewhat less minimal, although not
much. While there are detailed provisions relating to obtaining and proving
authority to represent and for the ratification of any resulting contract, the
only provision that relates to the actual negotiation process is section 12(2)
which states that the employer shall "recognise the authority of that
[representative] to represent the employee... in those negotiations." ' 7
A second problem lies in the nature of the Act itself, which is a combi-
nation of a radical reforming Act and a re-enactment of previous law. 8 The
provisions in Parts I and II of the Act relating to freedom of association and
the negotiation of employment contracts were clearly intended to reform
radically the previous law. The same cannot necessarily be said for the per-
sonal grievance provisions in Part III, and indeed other aspects of the Act,
such as the disputes and enforcement procedures. There are, therefore,
strong arguments for adopting different approaches to different parts of the
Act and in particular for regarding Part III as essentially consolidating the
previous legislation.
It might also be commented that the parliamentary history is of limited
use in interpreting the Act. The fact that the final Act was the compromise
product of very different, and competing, policy and ideological agendas, all
of which are reflected in the parliamentary history, lessens the usefulness of
that record as an interpretative guide. In one case the Chief Judge of the
Employment Court said the following:
I feel bound to say that the framers of the Employment Contracts Act
1991 could not have intended to leave so much room for judicial doubt
and difference of opinion as has been left by section 12. The problems that
have arisen in practice could not have been foreseen. Perhaps Parliament
will revisit the topic one day. I hope that day will be soon. It is asking too
much to expect the Courts to read the legislators' minds to the extent that
has been necessary in these cases.39
The Chief Judge's comments could equally have referred to the defini-
tion of an unjustified dismissal when it was first enacted. It might also be
commented that his comment erred on the side of charity towards the legis-
lators who failed to consider fully the nature of the legislation they were en-
acting or the obvious and foreseeable difficulties it was likely to pose in
practice. Either the legislature chose to avoid making those decisions, leav-
ing the issues to be decided by the courts, or it was so committed to its
ideological position that it refused to recognize that the world might behave
in a manner different than that envisaged by new-right "theory."
37. ECA § 12(2).
38. See Common Law, supra note 3, at 243-51.
39. N.Z. Airline Pilots Association v. Airways Corp. of N.Z. (No 1) [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z.
545,583.
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IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE RECOGNITION OF A
REPRESENTATIVE' S AUTHORITY4°
A. The Statutory Framework
The most striking characteristic of the language of the ECA as it relates
to the negotiation of contracts of employment is that of choice and of the
rights of the parties to determine the nature of their own relationship. The
Act allows the parties to an employment relationship to choose the type of
contract that will govern their relationship, with the type of contract being
agreed through negotiation, and employees being able to choose whether
they negotiate personally or through a representative.1 The critical issue,
given the bargaining advantage that accrues to employers by virtue of their
superior economic power, is whether the Act provides sufficient support to
ensure that employees are able to exercise fully the choices provided to
them and in particular the choice to bargain collectively through a union and
enter into collective contracts. The substantive provisions that allow em-
ployee choices to be implemented are, to put it mildly, minimal and provide
little guidance for the courts. Section 10 provides: "(1) Each person may, in
negotiating for an employment contract- (a) Determine whether that per-
son wishes to be represented by a person, group or organisation." 2 The only
provision" which places some obligation on an employer to respect that
choice is Section 12(2), which provides that the employer shall "recognise
the authority of that [representative] to represent the employee ... in those
negotiations."'
By default Section 12(2) became the critical legal support for collective
bargaining as, for example, an employer is under no statutory obligation to
negotiate with an authorized union, let alone to do so in good faith. 4' Even if
employees choose to negotiate collectively, they have no right to a collec-
tive contract-itself a matter for negotiation. In practice, of course, once
employees are able to organize in a union, the likelihood increases that they
will succeed in obtaining a collective contract. In response employers may
40. For a more extended discussion, see Collective Bargaining, supra note 8, at 114-24.
41. While employers are also free to choose to negotiate through a representative (and
indeed would have to do so if a corporation), this right is of little practical relevance in the
context of this discussion.
42. Employment Contracts Act § 10, 1991 (N.Z.).
43. Two other provisions of the Act should be mentioned. First, Part I of the Act, which
deals with freedom of association, prohibits undue influence in relation to membership or
non-membership of employee organizations, ECA § 8. Second, once bargaining authorization
has been obtained, employers are required to grant the representative access to the authoriz-
ing employees to discuss matters relating to negotiations for an employment contract, ECA
§14. See also Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd. v. National Distribution Union Inc. [1995] 1
E,R.N.Z. 110 (C.A.); MAZENGARB, supra note 8, para. 14.2-14.10.
44. ECA § 12(2).
45. On whether such an obligation arises out of the implied terms of the employment
relationship, see Collective Bargaining, supra note 8, at 124-28.
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attempt to exclude or weaken the union or to weaken its employees' coher-
ence so that the union becomes irrelevant. Alternatively, an employer may
attempt to bypass the union and negotiate directly with employees or com-
municate directly with employees to persuade them to accept an offer.
In interpreting Section 12(2), what guidance can be claimed from the
objects provisions in the Act? The objects clause in the long title of the ECA
states that the Act's object is:
... to promote an efficient labor market and in particular-
a. to provide for freedom of association:
b. to allow employees to determine who should represent their interests in
relation to employment issues: and
c.to enable each employee' to choose either
i. to negotiate an individual employment contract with his or her em
ployer; or
ii. To be bound by a collective employment contract to which his or her
employer is a party
e. To establish that the question of whether employment contracts are in-
dividual or collectivd or both is a matter for negotiation by the parties
themselves.4
The objects section for Part II reinforces these primary objects.' It
states that the objects of Part II are to establish that employees and employ-
ers may conduct negotiations on their own behalf or may choose to be rep-
resented by another group or person and that arrangements to govern the
employment relationship are a matter for negotiation. Thus, employees, as
well as employers, are entitled to choices in relation to their employment,
including the right to choose to bargain collectively. An employer is, how-
ever, entitled to resist its employees' choice.
B. Interpreting Section 12(2)
The predictable effect of the legislature's failure to provide a coherent
framework for collective bargaining was that the courts were left to deter-
mine what constraints, if any, the ECA placed on an employer when negoti-
ating with its employees' union. Such decisions were clearly likely to be
extremely controversial, since they required the courts to formulate legal
principles in an area that was politically contentious and which went to the
heart of the philosophy of the ECA. The Court's task was further compli-
cated by the nature of the cases presented. Although the early cases con-
cerned employer attempts to defeat union representation where a union
presence was relatively weak or vulnerable, later cases centered on attempts
by employers to bypass established unions to communicate directly with
46. Employers have a similar choice-see object (d).
47. ECA title.
48. ECA § 9.
10
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1997], Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/11
1997] INTERPRETING THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 127
employees with the intention of persuading them to accept the employer's
negotiating offer. This shift in the focus of the cases moved the debate away
from the issues of freedom of association and the right to bargain collec-
tively, where it was more difficult for employers to gain sympathy, to the
right of employers to communicate with their employees. Employers
strongly and vocally opposed limitations on their ability to communicate di-
rectly with employees concerning ongoing negotiations and claimed that
such restrictions were contrary to the spirit of the ECA, which, they argued,
was intended to strengthen the individual employer-employee relationship. 9
They were also able to characterize such restrictions as contrary to their
right of freedom of expression guaranteed by the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act.
1. The Alliance Textiles Cases
The starting point for a consideration of Section 12(2) is a case that had
its origins in the first month after the ECA was enacted. Alliance Textiles,
wishing to negotiate a new contract significantly diminishing existing con-
ditions, attempted to exclude the union from negotiations and exerted very
strong pressure on individual employees to persuade them to revoke the
bargaining authority given to the union and to bargain directly with the em-
ployer. The "bargaining" consisted of first signing a revocation of authority
and, immediately afterwards, the employer-drafting a standard form con-
tract. These tactics eventually proved successful, with a majority of employ-
ees signing the new contract.
The resulting case, Adams v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd.,5" highlighted
the fact that the ECA provided little protection from such conduct. The
Court held that an employer could engage in such tactics as long as the con-
duct did not amount to duress or undue influence. If this standard was
breached, the employer's conduct could be challenged under Section 8
(which prohibits duress or undue influence in relation to union membership)
and Section 57 (which allows contracts obtained by "harsh and oppressive
behaviour or by undue influence or duress" to be set aside). It was held that
no such conduct had been established on the facts of this case.5 The Court
also held that, while an employer could not negotiate directly with an em-
ployee while an authority remained in force, it remained free to approach an
employee directly to attempt to persuade them to withdraw their authority.
If such persuasion was successful, and the pressure used was not undue, di-
rect negotiations with the employee did not breach Section 12(2).2:
Adams had the potential to provide employers with a virtual carte
49. See INTERPRErATION, supra note 23, at 21-23.
50. [1992] 1 E.R.N.Z. 982.
51. Id. at 1039-40.
52. Id. at 1024.
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blanche to undermine collective bargaining by isolating individual employ-
ees, persuading them to revoke the authority given to their union, and then
accept the employer's offer-tactics likely to seriously weaken all employ-
ees collectively represented. Even if undue influence or duress could be es-
tablished and as the case makes clear this may be very difficult in practice,
it is unlikely to provide an effective remedy for attacks on collective bar-
gaining. Unless conduct that might constitute undue influence can be pre-
vented by injunction, a later legal action is unlikely to remedy the damage
done, as undue influence can only be established after the event and for each
individual employee.53
Adams was appealed (as Eketone v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd.') and
the approach taken by the Employment Court partially overruled.5 While
the Court accepted that Part I of the Act permitted an employer to attempt to
persuade its employees in relation to union membership, it drew a distinc-
tion between this and an employer's options under Part II, holding that, once
a union was authorized to represent an employee, the employee's choice
must be respected and given effect by the employer as required by Section
12(2).56 The President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Cooke, held that,
though the Act is union-neutral, "employers are not bound to be union-
neutral ... they are free to express views against unionism."'57 Section 12,
however, imposes an obligation that during negotiations the employer must
recognize the authority given to the union and not negotiate directly with
those employees:
To go behind the union's back does not seem consistent with recognising
its authority. The contrary argument advanced for the employer here is
that authority can be recognised by trying to persuade the giver of the
authority to revoke it. That seems to me a rather cynical argument not in
accord with the true intent, meaning and spirit of the enactment.... Cer-
tainly an employer is free not to negotiate with anyone; but if he wishes to
negotiate I doubt if he can bypass an authorised representative.58
The judgment of Justice Gault was important for two reasons. First, he
held that it is appropriate for the Court to have reference to international in-
struments relating to freedom of association, including ILO Conventions 87
53. Section 57 also requires individual (as opposed to class) actions, MAZENGARB, supra
note 8, para. 57.4, and even if an action was legally feasible, a union would need to find an
employee party to any contract prepared to be named as plaintiff in an action, an option un-
likely to appeal to employees who had already succumbed to the employer's pressure and
who would fear retaliation for any such initiative.
54. Eketone v. Alliance Textiles (N.Z.) Ltd. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783.
55. Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeal's decision was obiter (i.e., not formally bind-
ing), as no live issues remained between the parties by the time of the hearing.
56. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783, 787, per Justice Cooke. Three other judges concurred in the
judgment.
57. Id. at 786.
58. Id. at 787.
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and 98,9 in interpreting the ECA. Second, he stated that, while the right to
elect to bargain collectively is not a necessary element of freedom of asso-
ciation, it is a right conferred by Part II of the Act and "should be fully ac-
corded, bearing in mind ILO Convention 98."' Justice Gault did, however,
express some reservations as to whether all attempts at persuasion by em-
ployers could be prohibited because of the need to assure an employer's
freedom of expression. This issue came to prominence in later cases.
2. The Approach of the Employment Court Following Eketone
Clearly, Eketone required a modified approach to Section 12(2), and
over several cases the Employment Court reassessed an employer's obliga-
tions under the Section. In New Zealand Medical Laboratory Workers Un-
ion v. Capital Coast Health Ltd.,6 the facts involved an employer who had,
over several years, made a number of attempts to bypass the relatively small
plaintiff union and negotiate directly with employees. The Court found the
employer's actions to be in breach of Section 12(2) and granted an injunc-
tion prohibiting further breaches. The Court first held that "negotiations"
were not confined to the formal aspects of the process, describing them as
"an amorphous process" encompassing all stages from the initial offer and
including the use of tactics to force the pace of the negotiations or to affect
their shape.62 It then held that, where an employer's actions were intended to
disadvantage employees in their ability to bargain, there would be a breach
of Section 12(2). The Court was not prepared to rule out all employer at-
tempts at persuasion, such as imparting information, opinion, and other
material, but stressed that actions that "undermine the authority of the repre-
sentative" were likely to be unlawful regardless of the motives of the em-
ployer.63
The most articulated expression of the Employment Court's position is
found in Ivamy v. New Zealand Fire Services Commission.' The employer,
allegedly in breach of a previous undertaking to the Court, and with the help
of a public relations company, developed a strategy to present new, and sig-
nificantly changed, contract proposals directly to individual firefighters. The
material included detailed terms of an offer which the employer was yet to
make to the union and an offer of a $4,000 payment if the employment con-
tract was signed by a set date. The Employment Court held that the material
went well beyond factual explanatory material and that it was an attempt to
59. These two conventions have not been ratified by New Zealand.
60. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783, 794.
61. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 93.
62. Id. at 117. It will be recalled that the employer's obligation is to recognize the
authority "in negotiations."
63. Id. at 127-28.
64. [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z. 724.
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bypass the union and to negotiate directly with employees. 5
The decision is notable first for its concern with providing effective
remedies for unlawful employer conduct during negotiations, the Court
making it clear that injunctions may be granted to restrain conduct in breach
of Section 12(2). The second central element in the Court's reasoning was
that the right of freedom of association and the right to choose to be collec-
tively represented by a union are not token rights but are to be enforced in
light of the reality of industrial relations practice. The approach of the Court
was perhaps best seen in the following passage:
Where collective bargains are to be made, those who bargain collectively
alone can decide what their collective will is. It is legitimate for their rep-
resentative to take part in their decision making, but not for the other party
to the negotiations to do so. Attempts to interfere in this process can in-
volve taking liberties with the rights of the employees collectively to play
their full role in an efficient labor market. It is to be expected that differ-
ent representatives will have different styles of representing and will differ
in competence and other respects. Some will be sympathetic to the em-
ployer's problems, others will seem more difficult to deal with. That can-
not be helped and must be accepted, however inconvenient, as a fact of
industrial life.6
The most contentious point to emerge from Ivamy, however, was the
Court's view that, if employees choose to negotiate through a union, then all
negotiations and all relevant communications must be channeled through
that union. While the Court made it clear that not all communications relat-
ing to negotiations were prohibited, it did indicate that those designed to
promote an employer's offer, or to persuade employees to accept it, were
likely to be contrary to Section 12(2).' The Court did not see this require-
ment as curtailing the employer's freedom of speech, since the communica-
tion was still to the employees "even if psychologically it may not seem
SO . 68
3. Subsequent Developments in the Court of Appeal
Since the Employment Court decision in Ivamy, the Court of Appeal
has delivered three decisions concerning Section 12(2). The overall effect of
these decisions has been to restrict significantly the liberal construction of
Section 12(2) initiated in Eketone. In the first of these decisions, Capital
Coast Health Ltd.,69 the Court, except on one point, dismissed the appeal
65. Id. at 770-71.
66. Id. at 761-62.
67. The Court was careful to indicate that normal day-to-day employer-employee com-
munications were not affected. See, e.g., Couling v. Carter Holt Harvey Ltd. [1995] 2
E.R.N.Z. 137, where the Court accepted that the employer's motive was not to undermine the
union.
68. [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z. 724, 766.
69. Capital Coast Health Ltd. v. NZ Med. Lab. Workers Union Inc. [1995 ] 2 E.R.N.Z.
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and reaffirmed the principles it had set out in Eketone. The Court stated
that the ECA was essentially practical legislation and should not be sub-
jected to esoteric analysis. Its application was a matter of balancing the
competing rights of the parties-those of the employer to freedom of ex-
pression under Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act and those of the em-
ployee under Section 12 of the Employment Contracts Act-not a case of
one prevailing over the other. It then stated:
Once [negotiation] is under way with an authorised representative partici-
pating, the process may not be conducted directly with the party so repre-
sented. The provision of factual information does not impinge on that
process. But anything that is intended or is calculated to persuade or to
threaten the consequences of not yielding does. Attempts to undermine the
authority of the agent may be in breach of [Section] 8(1), but will also be
in breach of [Section] 12(2), because it is for the particular parties to
choose their representative. It is their right to have that person act on their
behalf without interference.
This case must now be read in the light of the two more recent Court of
Appeal decisions, New Zealand Fire Serv. Comm'n v. Ivamy2 and Airways
Corporation of New Zealand v. Bean.73 In the majority decision in Ivamy,74
Justice Gault provided what he described as a "brief elaboration" of the
law,75 which is a clear repudiation of the approach of the Employment Court
in Ivamy, and also, although the Court appears to deny this, of its own deci-
sion in Eketone. Two aspects of the majority judgment are of particular sig-
nificance. The first is the restrictive approach taken to freedom of associa-
tion. The Court held that, although bargaining rights may arise out of
freedom of association, they are not, as such, an element of freedom of as-
sociation.76 In particular, an employer's obligations under Section 12(2) are
a purely statutory obligation. This approach allowed the Court to then give
primacy to an employer's freedom of expression guaranteed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which requires that statutes, where possible,
''must be given a meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms" in the
305 (C.A.). Although his case was heard before the Employment Court decided Ivamy, the
decision was not delivered until after the Ivamy decision was delivered by the Employment
Court.
70. In New Zealand Fire Serv. Comm'n v. Ivamy [19961 1 E.R.N.Z. 85, 100, the Court of
Appeal later said, "Notwithstanding all of the argument addressed to us, we consider that it is
a sufficient statement of the law to be applied in the circumstances of particular cases."
71. [1995] 2 E.R.N.Z. 305,320.
72. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85.
73. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 126.
74. The two decisions were delivered contemporaneously, and Ivamy contains the most
developed argument of the Court of Appeal's position.
75. This accounted for four pages of the decision.
76. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85, 100. This view is not unusual in common law jurisdictions.
See Colleymore v. A-G [1970] App. Cas. 538 (P.C.), and Reference re Pub. Serv. Employee
Relations Act [1987] D.L.R. 4th 161.
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Act.' These rights include both freedom of expression78 and freedom of as-
sociation. By confining the latter to the right to join a union, the right to
bargain collectively was able to be interpreted restrictively and read subject
to an employer's freedom of expression when a conflict arose between the
two rights. The Court did, however, take a more restrictive approach in its
cursory dismissal of the argument that employees' freedom of expression
included a right to decline to receive employer-generated information, or to
receive it only through their union."
The second aspect of the majority opinion is its lack of any reference to
the ILO principles of freedom of association. This omission is particularly
striking for two reasons. First, in his earlier judgment in Eketone Justice
Gault explicitly stated that "the right [to elect and pursue collective bar-
gaining] is conferred by Part II of the Employment Contracts Act and that
right should be fully accorded, bearing in mind ILO Convention No. 98
concerning the right to organise and bargain collectively."" The second rea-
son is that this decision was made shortly after the highly publicized report
of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association on the ECA.1 This Re-
port explicitly made the point that the principles of freedom of association,
enshrined in the ILO Constitution, have application in New Zealand as a
consequence of its ILO membership, and regardless of the fact that it has
not ratified Conventions 87 and 98.2 It appears that the Court of Appeal
now views object (a) in the Long Title, "to provide for freedom of associa-
tion," as confined to the right to join a union and regards international obli-
gations and ILO conventions as irrelevant to the interpretation of the Act.
The Court did reiterate that, while "persuasion as to the reasonableness
of an employer's stance on an issue, which all parties understand is the
subject of negotiations between representatives," need not be in breach of
Section 12(2), persuasion of employees to exclude the representative and to
enter into direct contacts with the employer would breach the section.83
While the Court set out a range of general factors that might be relevant in
answering its question, it concluded that an answer was really "a matter of
practical common sense.""
The difficulty with such broad statements is, of course, that they pro-
vide only limited guidance for future cases and leave considerable room for
judicial latitude. In this case three judges (if one includes the Employment
77. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act § 6, 1990.
78. This includes... "the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and opinions
of any kind in any form." Id. at § 14.
79. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85, 100.
80. [1993] 2 E.R.N.Z. 783, 794.
81. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No 1698: Complaint Against the
Government of New Zealand, 77 OFFICIAL BuLL. 39 (1994).
82. Id. para. 240.
83. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85, 101-02.
84. Id. at 101.
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Court) were able to reach one view of the employer's conduct and three an-
other. Notwithstanding that appeals are permitted only on a point of law,"
the crucial factor in the Court's decision was not the law (which they pur-
ported not to develop) but a differing interpretation of the factual issue of
whether the employer's conduct went beyond persuasion to become a direct
negotiation. The majority took what can only be described as an extremely
charitable view of the employer's motives and actions. The two dissenting
opinions both held that the initial findings of fact were clearly open to the
Employment Court."
Justice Thomas, in a strongly worded-and extremely cogent--dissent
notable for its careful analysis of both the law and the facts as found by the
Employment Court, concluded that the Chief Judge's decision "was... the
only decision properly open to him."'87 After concluding that the ECA per-
mits collective bargaining, he stated:
Section 12(2) must, therefore, be interpreted and applied having full re-
gard to that consideration. Recognition of the agent's authority at a level
lower than that which is necessary to preserve the process of collective
bargaining defeats the very object of these statutory provisions.... It is
my concern that a decision in favour of the Commission in this case will
be perceived by employers and employees alike as significantly eroding
the import of Section 12(2) and thereby undermining the practice of col-
lective bargaining."8
Finally, given the history of the case law described above, it is some-
what ironic that in the Airways Corporation case the Court of Appeal stated
that its views in Ivamy "do not differ from what was said by the Employ-
ment Court in Adams v. Alliance Textiles to the extent apparently appre-
hended by the Chief Judge so far as he sees them as a rejection of the ro-
bustness of approach favored in his Court." 9
C. Comment
The main question addressed in this Article is whether the decisions of
the Employment Court are contrary to the intentions of Parliament and have
limited the reforms of 1991. Clearly, if the Court was minded to limit the
application of the Act, either because of old habits or in an attempt to re-
store "balance," Part II would be the logical Part of the Act to use for this
purpose as it was central to the government's successful strategy to radically
restructure collective bargaining in New Zealand. It is, however, clear that,
85. Employment Contracts Act § 135, 1991 (N.Z.).
86. [1996] 1 E.R.N.Z. 85, 93 (per Justice Cooke), 112 (per Justice Thomas).
87. Id. at 112.
88. Id. at 124.
89. For an employer's perspective on the Court of Appeal decision, see Barbara Burton,
Ivamy or Balance Restored, EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 88 (1996).
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whatever some employers might like to believe, the Act expressly permits
an employee to choose to negotiate through a union, and that a group of em-
ployees may authorize that union to negotiate a collective contract and, if
necessary, to resort to a strike to achieve such a contract." The question that
arises is whether Section 12(2) prevents an employer resisting collective ne-
gotiations by undermining or bypassing the agency relationship between
employees and their unions. The decisions of both the Court of Appeal and
the Employment Court are unanimous that this cannot be done. Thus, the
central issue has become where to draw the line between conduct that un-
dermines the union or bypasses a union and conduct that constitutes direct
bargaining and legitimate communication. This line is difficult to draw and
will depend very much on the facts of a particular case. Employers, who are
clearly likely to be more interested in persuading than informing, are likely
to push that line as far as possible.
A reading of the cases indicates that there is a difference in approach
between the Employment Court and the majority of the Court of Appeal.
What is a little more difficult to discern is the width of that gap, as the
statements of the law are sufficiently vague to encompass a range of views
on any particular set of facts. The difference appears to arise because the
Employment Court, and the minority in the Court of Appeal, focuses to a
greater extent on the employee's choice to negotiate through a union with
the decision implied in that choice not to be directly involved in the nego-
tiation process. This viewpoint makes considerable sense from an em-
ployee's perspective, since it is likely to be less damaging to an ongoing
employment relationship and limits the employer's ability to put direct pres-
sure on the employee. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, appears more
sympathetic to an employer's perspective. Employers argue that unions fail
to appreciate an employer's needs and generate unnecessary conflict be-
tween employer and employee and that direct communication is often re-
quired if the employer's offer is to be properly understood.
A difference of approach does not, however, mean that the Employment
Court is in some way undermining the ECA. Indeed, given the case history
described above, the Employment Court's initial reaction was favorable to
the new-right perspective of the ECA.0 ' Its subsequent approach has been
dictated by the Court of Appeal's decision in Eketone, where the Court
clearly held that Section 12(2) was to be interpreted to give real protection
to an employee's right to authorize a union as its representative. Subsequent
decisions cannot seriously be regarded as deviating from the law as laid
down in that case. Since Eketone, the main force driving legal developments
has been the changing position of the Court of Appeal, where the majority is
taking an increasingly restrictive approach to the ECA. While the new-right
may object to the Employment Court's decisions, it is clear that those ob-
90. ECA § 64.
91. See the endorsement of the Alliance decision in THE COURT, supra note 21, at 36-37.
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jections have no basis in law and in no way justify the extreme claims that
the Court is undermining the intentions of Parliament.
V. UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSAL
A. The Personal Grievance Provisions
Unlike Part II of the ECA, which was entirely novel legislation in 1991,
the personal grievance provisions in Part III were substantially the same
provisions as in the Labour Relations Act and, indeed, as they had existed
since 1973."2 The only substantive provision relating to unjustified dismissal
is (the now) Section 27(1)(a), which states simply that employees have a
personal grievance if they claim they have been "unjustifiably dismissed."
As a result, the law is almost entirely judge made, Parliament leaving the
courts the task of determining such matters as what is a dismissal, what con-
stitutes justification, whether the term encompasses a constructive dis-
missal, and whether a dismissal must be carried out in a manner that is pro-
cedurally fair. These issues had been resolved by the courts, and by 1991 the
law was largely settled. It should be stressed that the Court of Appeal has
both supported the broad legal principles developed in the Labour Court and
has itself taken a relatively liberal approach to labor law matters.93 It can be
safely assumed that those responsible for the ECA were well aware of the
nature of that law before the Act was passed.'
While significant changes were made to the personal grievance provi-
sions in the ECA, those changes did not affect the substantive law of dis-
missal. The most significant change was, in fact, to extend the right to con-
test a dismissal to that proportion of the work force that had not been union
members prior to 1991. Other changes affected only procedural matters.95
Finally, the point should be made that the Court has no first instance juris-
diction in relation to personal grievances; cases are heard on appeal from the
Employment Tribunal. The great majority of cases are in fact settled by me-
diation without a formal hearing.96 Criticism is therefore directed at those
92. Gordon Anderson, The Origins and Development of the Personal Grievance Proce-
dure in New Zealand, 13 N.Z. J. Indus. Rel. 257 (1988).
93. See, e.g., the Court of Appeal's decisions in Auckland City Council v. Hennessy
[1982] A.C.J. 699 (accepting the need for procedural fairness in dismissals); Auckland Shop
Employees Union v. Woolworths N.Z. Ltd. [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 372 (upholding the concept of
a constructive dismissa 1); Marlborough Harbour Bd. v. Goulden [1985] 2 N.Z.L.R. 378 (the
first of several cases holding that there was a mutual obligation of fair treatment in an em-
ployment relationship). The major difference between the two courts before 1991 concerned
an employer's obligation to establish the justification for a redundancy. In GN Hale & Sons
Ltd. v. Wellington Caretakers Union [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 151, the Court of Appeal opted for a
much more conservative approach than the Labour Court. For a detailed account of the law
on unjustified dismissal, see MAZENGARB, supra note 8.
94. This is indicated by new-right efforts to have the law changed.
95. An example of such a procedural matter is the time for submitting a grievance.
96. The figure for mediated settlements is in the range of 80 percent but varies from
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cases where an appeal is regarded as warranted, although the decisions in
those cases are clearly influential for the law in general.
B. The Areas of Discontent
This Article will confine itself to a few comments on those aspects of
the law most criticized by the new-right: procedural fairness, fixed-term
contracts, and redundancy compensation as an aspect of procedural fairness.
It should be noted that new-right groups have also been critical of other de-
cisions, including decisions relating to the content of implied terms in con-
tracts of employment.7
1. Procedural Fairness
The criticism by employers that a dismissal which is justifiable on sub-
stantive grounds may be held to be unjustifiable if carried out in a manner
that is procedurally unfair is not new." This criticism is understandable in
some cases and reflects both a feeling of unfairness and a frustration that
unsuitable employees cannot be dismissed without some risk.99 The rule is
not, however, unique to New Zealand and had been developed in other ju-
risdictions before the personal grievance procedure was enacted in New
Zealand.'00 A clause in the EC Bill, as introduced to Parliament, would have
minimized the role of procedural fairness where the dismissal "would oth-
erwise have been substantively justifiable,''. but this was not carried into
the final Act. Instead, Parliament restricted changes to a provision that con-
tributory conduct by an employee may disentitle the employee to some or
all of the compensation that would otherwise be payable," which was al-
ready the practice of the Court. While employers remain discontented with
dismissal cases, the law has not changed since 1991, and the Court has con-
tinued to apply the law as previously understood.
center to center. Alistair Dumbleton, The Employment Tribunal-Four Years On, 21 N.Z. J.
INDUs. REL. 21, at 22-23 (1996).
97. The most detailed employer criticisms were in THE COURT, supra note 21. See also
INTERPRETATION, supra note 23. For other analyses, see Policy, supra note 9; Ellen Dannin,
Consummating Market-Based Labor Law Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfigu-
ration, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267 (1996). Employer beliefs about the state of the law often over-
estimate the degree of employee protection, an effect exacerbated by the high degree of pub-
licity given to dismissal law.
98. Most of the cases criticized in THE COURT, supra note 21, were decided before 1991.
99. Whether these feelings are justified is another matter. A sense of unfairness, often
very acute, is typical of either party in a dismissal case.
100. See, for example, the United Kingdom case of John v. Rees [1970] Ch 345 per Me-
garry J at 402. This passage has been quoted by the New Zealand courts.
101. Employment Contracts Bill, cl. 17(3), 1990 (N.Z.).
102. Employment Contracts Act §§ 40(2), 41(3), 1991 (N.Z.).
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2. Fixed-term Contracts
The employer argument relating to fixed-term contracts has a different
basis, as it springs not from a sense of unfairness but from the belief that
employers should be free to use fixed-term contracts when they see them as
necessary and that restrictions on this right restrict their freedom of contract.
Such an argument clearly gained strength with the passage of the ECA with
its emphasis on the rights of the parties to choose the form of their own re-
lationships. Again, however, the law on fixed-term contracts was clear be-
fore 1991. In New Zealand Food Processing Union v. ICI (N.Z.) Ltd., the
Labour Court held that fixed-term contracts were legitimate where there was
a commercial justification but that in some circumstances the failure to re-
new such a contract might amount to a dismissal. 3 The main situations
were where the need for a fixed-term no longer existed, where the employer
had created a legitimate expectation of renewal, or where the termination of
the contract was brought about by a wrong motive."l The rationale for the
Court's approach was to ensure that fixed-term contracts could not be used
to defeat the right to challenge an unjustified dismissal. ICI was confirmed
by the Employment Court in Smith v. Radio i Ltd. 5
Recently, however, the Court of Appeal in Principal of Auckland Col-
lege of Education v. Haggt" has overruled these cases and held that the ex-
piration of a fixed term is not a "dismissal," and thus cannot found a per-
sonal grievance, unless there has, during the term of the contract, been an
express or implied agreement to renew the contract.'O' The effect of the deci-
sion is that an employer need have no justification for the use of a fixed-
term contract and may use such contracts purely to avoid the unjustified
dismissal provisions in the Act, a result clearly pointed out by the Court.
The Court did not discuss whether Parliament intended to allow the personal
grievance provisions to be avoided by such a technical device.0 8
3. The Need for Procedural Fairness in Redundancy Dismissals
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Brighouse Ltd. v. Bilderbeck"'9
has been the subject of considerable criticism by the new-right."' Prior to
103. [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 24.
104. Id.
105. [1995] 1 E.R.N.Z. 281.
106. [1997] 1 E.R.N.Z. 116.
107. This exception is of course consistent with standard contract rules that allow the
parties to modify a contract during its term.
108. Justice Thomas (dissenting) concluded that "[i]t cannot be thought that Parliament
intended that the Act would be able to be so easily circumvented" by allowing employers to
adopt a format deliberately designed to avoid the statutory obligations. [1997] 1 E.R.N.Z.
116, 134.
109. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243 (C.A.).
110. The Executive Director of the BRT, Roger Kerr, said of this decision that "it was a
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Brighouse Ltd., a line of Employment Court cases had held that in a redun-
dancy, as with any other dismissal, an employer must act fairly and that this
obligation may, in some cases, require an employer to pay compensation for
redundancy even if the contract of employment is silent on the matter. Al-
though given the opportunity to reconsider the law in Brighouse Ltd., the
Court confirmed the decisions. While a minority disagreed that an award of
compensation could include an amount for the employer's failure to pay re-
dundancy pay, it should be stressed that even the dissenting judges accepted
that procedural fairness was required in any dismissal.'" The major ground
for the new-right criticism of this decision is that it implies into a contract
an obligation that the parties did not contemplate in their contract. This may
be so, although it should be stressed that procedural fairness is not con-
cerned with contractual rights, but rather is part of a statute-based obligation
that requires fairness in dismissals.
C. Discussion
As was the case with the interpretation of Section 12(2), the question to
be answered is whether the interpretation of the unjustified dismissal provi-
sions of the ECA has remained within the permissible limits of judicial dis-
cretion. Clearly, the Court has chosen to make the assumption that no sig-
nificant change was intended to the law with the passage of the ECA. This
assumption is clearly supportable in that an Act which radically altered the
law relating to the negotiation of contracts of employment made no changes
to the substance of the law on unjustified dismissal. Moreover, given the
debate on this aspect of the Act, it seems clear that Parliament deliberately
chose not to amend the law. Is there then a case that the law should have
been reinterpreted? Again, there seems little legal justification for such an
argument, which would seem to rely on some implied intention of Parlia-
ment that the law be reinterpreted. It should also be pointed out that as the
main legal principles had been endorsed by the Court of Appeal, the Em-
ployment Court remained bound by those decisions. If a reinterpretation of
the law was to be justified, the proper forum for this change was the Court
of Appeal. With the exception of fixed-term contracts, where the Court of
Appeal had not previously given a definitive view, that Court has confirmed
the general principles of unjustified dismissal that pre-dated the Act.
Two points become clear if one examines the rhetoric of much of the
criticism of the Court's interpretation of the law. The first is that it is often
not the interpretation of the law as such which is objected to but rather its
application in some cases where employers find the results unfair. The sec-
ond is that the criticism is also used to advance the position advocated by
direct and conscious snub to Parliament's intentions in passing the Employment Contracts
Act." Appeals to the Privy Council, New Zealand Bar Association Conference (1995). See
also INTERPRETATION, supra note 23, at 7-12.
111. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243, 258-59 (per Justice Richardson), 270 (per Justice Gault).
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both the NZEF and BRT that employment should be "at will."". This argu-
ment was not accepted by Parliament in 1991.
V. THE EMPLOYMENT COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEAL
From about the time of the ECA, there appears to have been some di-
vergence between the Court of Appeal and the Employment Court in their
approaches to employment law. With the change to a common law based
system of labor law that places less emphasis on collective labor law and
favors the individual contract of employment, one emerging factor is that
the Court of Appeal is more comfortable with the law than when labor law
was a specialist statutory system. As a consequence, the guidance to be de-
rived from the Employment Court, with its specialist expertise and experi-
ence of employment and industrial relations matters, may be perceived as
less important and less relevant than previously. One indication of this
change is that the Court of Appeal has adopted a more orthodox contractual
approach to employment than the Employment Court, which is seemingly
more sympathetic to the argument that contracts of employment are a spe-
cialized form of contract with its own rules. In Cunningham v. TNT World-
wide Express (N.Z.) Ltd."', the Court of Appeal held that, in deciding who
was an employee, the fundamental test was the intention of the parties as
stated in the contract and that the Employment Court had been mistaken in
disregarding the stated intention of the parties in favor of the traditional
common law tests."4 This decision is important, since it effectively allows
an employer to use a form of contract that deprives a person who is, in any
economic sense, an "employee" of the minimum statutory protections avail-
able to employees."'
A second factor is that there has been a change of personnel in the
Court of Appeal in the last few years and, in particular, the former President
Justice Cooke (generally regarded as a liberal) has retired and been suc-
ceeded by Justice Richardson (a conservative)." 6 This and other changes ap-
pear to have led to a more orthodox, black letter Court. The more orthodox
112. See THE COURT, supra note 21, at46.
113. [1993] 1 E.R.N.Z. 694.
114. See also Attorney-General v. NZPPTA [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 1, where the Court of
Appeal held that no different approach was to be applied to the implication of terms in a con-
tract of employment than in any other contract.
115. The ECA itself, together with minimum wage laws and laws on minimum holidays,
apply only to "employees," a term that is not defined in statute but depends on the common
law definition of a contract of employment. It is not clear how far the Court would take this
approach if there were an attempt to exclude minimum entitlements. In Cashman v. Central
Reg'l Health Auth. [1996] 2 E.R.N.Z. 156 (C.A.), the Court took a very liberal approach to
the statutory definition of a "homeworker" so as to provide statutory protection. The ECA
deems "homeworkers" to be "employees." Employment Contracts Act § 2, 1991 (N.Z.).
116. The President can influence not only the tenor of the Court but, more importantly,
the composition of the judges making up the Court for any particular hearing.
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influence, in both political and legal terms, is quite clear in a number of the
cases discussed above, especially Ivamy and Hagg. It might also be noted
that Justice Richardson delivered a strong dissent in Bilderbeck Ltd., where
he held that there is no room for the payment of redundancy compensation
as an aspect of procedural fairness and only limited room for procedural
fairness generally in a redundancy decision. His judgment emphasizes
commercial certainty and the need for an employer to be able to plan with
certainty and is clearly tied to a unilateral view of the employment relation-
ship."7 He has also stated, in a revealing comment, that "it is not open to the
Courts to construct an extra-statutory concept of social justice applicable in
redundancy situations."''.
The full impact of what seems to be a changing dynamic in the Court of
Appeal is still difficult to predict. What does seem clear is that the Court of
Appeal is likely to take an orthodox contractual approach to employment
and to view employment in purely contractual terms. It also seems clear
from Ivamy that the Court shows considerably more sympathy with employ-
ers attempting to negotiate with "difficult" unions and for unitarist, non-
conflictual theories of employment relationships than it does with employ-
ees wishing to negotiate collectively. This was a significant step back from
the position taken earlier in Eketone. While the Court of Appeal still appears
far from supportive of the full new-right agenda, as for example in its con-
tinuing support for procedural fairness in dismissals, it is nevertheless sym-
pathetic to employer arguments on the "right to manage," on the need for
"flexibility," and the need to be "competitive." Employee protections are
likely to be increasingly eroded at the margins as employers take advantage
of the changed approach of the Court and employees seeking to advance
their legal position before the Court face a less than receptive bench.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The major theme of this Article was to assess whether there is any sub-
stance in the new-right's allegations that the Employment Court has under-
mined, consciously or unconsciously, Parliament's intentions in passing the
ECA. The answer to this question must depend on whether the decisions of
the Employment Court were within the range of permissible options avail-
able to it according to the standard legal rules of statutory interpretation and
judicial precedent. The fact that the Court of Appeal has upheld appeals
from the Employment Court, either in whole or in part, does not of course
mean that the Employment Court's decisions were "wrong'" in the sense of
117. [1994] 2 E.R.N.Z. 243, 255.
118. G.N. Hale & Son Ltd. v. Wellington etc. Caretakers etc. IUOW [1990] E.R.N.Z.
Sel. Cas. 843, 852.
119. New-right critics (who are predominantly non-lawyers) tend to speak as if an over-
ruled decision was "wrong" in some absolute sense and on this basis argue that the Employ-
ment Court is making major legal mistakes.
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being outside the range of permissible decisions, let alone that the Court
was undermining the intentions of Parliament. Lower courts are often re-
versed on appeal and there is no indication that the Employment Court has a
record that differs substantially from other courts.2 0
The above analysis indicates that, when assessed in traditional legal
terms, the new-right's criticism of the Employment Court has little, if any,
credibility. The Employment Court's decisions may have been politically
controversial and may limit some employer bargaining strategies, but they
are clearly within the legally acceptable parameters of judicial decision-
making. The most difficult area for the Court was the interpretation of Sec-
tion 12(2). While the proponents of the ECA may have hoped that collective
bargaining would disappear or become totally marginalized, the reality was
that this was unlikely. The Court was, therefore, charged with the task of
interpreting the ECA as it applied to collective bargaining and to balance the
competing legal rights set out in the statute with minimal legislative guid-
ance. The Court's decision in Ivamy, the high point of a liberal approach to
Section 12(2), remained within the boundaries set out by the Court of Ap-
peal in Eketone. Given that the ECA allows employees the right to negotiate
through a union, and that the Court of Appeal stated that the ILO conven-
tions should be taken into account when interpreting the Act, the approach
adopted by the Employment Court was both justifiable and legitimate. In the
end, the decision as to whether the employer's conduct strayed over a very
inexact and shifting line was a factual one. That the Court of Appeal in
Ivamy has impliedly resiled from its earlier decision in Eketone and has de-
cided to shift the frontline is hardly the fault of the Employment Court.
The position in relation to unjustified dismissal seems even clearer in
the light of Parliament's refusal to amend the law in 1991. The Employment
Court continued to apply developed legal rules, which in most cases the
doctrine of precedent required it to adhere to. Indeed, if it had done other-
wise, accusations of judicial activism or of acting contrary to Parliament's
intention may have been more justified.'
What then of the new-right attack? What appears inescapable is that the
criticism of the Court's decisions and the attack on it is largely a political
attack by the new-right that has the dual function of attempting to persuade
the government that unjustified dismissal law should either be repealed or
significantly downgraded and of undermining the Court itself, the abolition
120. This information was supplied by John Hughes of the University of Canterbury and
is to form part of an article to be published as The Employment Court and the Court of Ap-
peal, EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. (forthcoming 1997). The results of appeals are difficult to assess
in simple terms, as an appellant may well obtain a reduction in the amount of damages, a par-
tial victory based on a different approach to the facts, or win a limited victory on a point of
law. Whether the original decision is "wrong" will depend on how the person calculating
chooses to classify each such case.
121. Howard appears to argue that the court should have been activist in this respect. See
INTERPRETATION, supra note 23, at 1. In new-right parlance, "judicial activism" appears to
mean making a decision with which the new-right disagrees.
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of which is also central to the new-right deregulation agenda. Members of
the new-right are of course entitled to argue for the implementation of their
agenda and for further deregulation, but the nature of that argument and the
tactics used to further it are unfortunate.' In particular, the characterization
of the Court as undermining the intention of Parliament is seriously mis-
leading and, to the extent that this is advanced as a serious legal argument,
is based on a flawed understanding of the judicial process and the rules that
goverh it. It may also be based on a particular approach to the law generally.
The new-right concept of law, particularly as advocated in New Zealand,12
is one that centers on a simplistic "classical" version of the common law
rules of contract, tort, and property. The freedom of the parties to enter into
any contract they regard as advantageous is regarded as a paramount virtue.
Thus, the task of the courts appears to be to enforce the resulting obligations
unless duress or the like has been established. There is clearly no room for
considerations such as inequality of bargaining power or fairness." Gov-
ernment intervention in the labor market that limits freedom of contract is
also strongly opposed in this view of the law. Given this vision of the law,
the new-right would clearly regard many of the decisions of both the Court
of Appeal and Employment Court as wrong. The difficulty with this argu-
ment is that it is concerned with a view of what the law should be in a new-
right world, not with what it is in the real world of the late twentieth cen-
tury.
Will the new-right succeed in abolishing the Employment Court and the
protection of the personal grievance procedure? It is difficult to predict the
political future, but at the time this Article is being written, it seems likely
that further deregulation can be expected. The current Minister of Labor ap-
pears to be sympathetic to BRT-NZEF arguments. 2 ' The Coalition Govern-
ment Agreement states that a formal study "will be conducted of the Em-
ployment Court's decisions to establish whether Parliament's intentions
have been clearly expressed for the purposes of minimising judicial activ-
ism in the employment area."' 26 Any resulting legislation is likely to include
122. For other comments on the new-right attack, see the comments by Gordon Ander-
son, supra note 36.
123. See Wilson, Policy, supra note 9, at 205. As noted above, the writings of Professor
Epstein have been particularly influential.
124. "The idea that there is any systematic inequality in bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees is a basic fallacy, which was rightly set aside in the Employment
Contracts Act." Roger Kerr, Executive Director BRT, Appeals to the Privy Council, New
Zealand Bar Association Conference (1995).
125. The Minister is an ex-Treasury and ex-NZEF official. The Minister's background
and the text of his speeches referred to below can be found (or accessed) on his homepage.
See supra note 32.
126. New Zealand currently has a conservative coalition government of two political
parties. The Agreement as it affects labor law is set out and discussed in Gordon Anderson,
The Coalition Government's Policy on Industrial Relations, EMPLOYMENT L. BULL. 28
(1997).
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a reduction in employee personal grievance rights, possibly some codifica-
tion of the substantive law, and some reform of the Employment Court. The
extent of further deregulation will depend, no doubt, on how the government
gauges political opinion at the time."v
127. At the time of finalizing this Article, the Government was preparing to release a
series of option papers on reforms to various aspects of the ECA. These should be accessible
through the Department of Labour's URL www.nzir.dol.govt.nz/index.html as they are re-
leased.
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